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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes important 
decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court.  The purpose of the 
Review is to indicate cases of first impression, cases of significantly altered 
earlier interpretations of North Dakota law, and other cases of interest.  As a 
special project, Associate Editors assist in researching and writing the 
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1. The North Dakota Law Review would like to thank the 2011-12 student articles editor, 
Jonathan Voigt for his hard work in writing these Supreme Court Reviews.  A special thanks to 
Associate Editor Jennifer Albaugh for her work on the In Re R.A. review. 
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT—THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY—
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 
In re Disciplinary Action Against Lucas 
 
In In re Disciplinary Action Against Lucas,2 the Disciplinary Board 
recommended Attorney A. William Lucas be publicly reprimanded and pay 
the costs of the disciplinary proceeding after the panel found that Lucas 
violated North Dakota Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 by communicating 
with a represented party.3  Counsel for the Disciplinary Board objected to 
the recommendation, contending Lucas should be suspended from the 
practice of law for thirty days.4  Lucas argued the evidence did not support 
the conclusion that he violated Rule 4.2.5  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court ruled clear and convincing evidence established Lucas violated the 
rule, and the court ordered Lucas be suspended from the practice of law for 
thirty days and pay the costs of the proceeding.6  Chief Justice VandeWalle, 
joined by Surrogate Judge Graff, sitting in place of Justice Maring, 
dissented because the court did not adopt the hearing panel’s sanction.7 
The Disciplinary Board filed a petition for discipline against Lucas in 
April 2009, claiming Lucas violated Rule 4.2 by sending letters to his 
Condominium Association and members of its board about pending 
litigation while the Association was represented by counsel.8  Lucas was a 
party to two cases against the Association, and he represented himself in 
both cases.9  The Association was represented by counsel in those cases.10  
During the second case, Lucas sent two letters to the board of the 
Association, one to a board member and one to an officer.11  These letters, 
as well as subsequent ones, criticized the Association’s lawyer’s perform-
ance, sought information about an interrogatory answer, and expressed a 
desire to settle the case.12 
 
2. 2010 ND 187, 789 N.W.2d 73. 
3. In re Disciplinary Action Against Lucas, ¶ 1, 789 N.W.2d at 74. 
4. Id. ¶¶ 1, 15, 789 N.W.2d at 74, 77. 
5. Id. ¶ 1, 789 N.W.2d at 74. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. ¶ 22, 789 N.W.2d at 79 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting). 
8. Id. ¶ 2, 789 N.W.2d at 74 (majority opinion). 
9. Id. ¶ 3. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. ¶ 4, 789 N.W.2d at 74-75. 
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The North Dakota Supreme Court explained that while Rule 4.2 forbids 
attorneys from speaking to a represented party in a matter about the subject 
of the matter, it does not specify whether the rule applies to attorneys 
representing themselves.13  The court noted Lucas sent letters to the 
Association’s board, which was represented by counsel, as well as a board 
member and officer, who have authority to act on issues in litigation.14  Due 
to their authorization, the letters were, therefore, sent to people who were 
included under the scope of Rule 4.2.15 
Lucas argued the letters do not violate Rule 4.2 because he was 
representing himself in the litigation.16  The court rejected his reasoning as 
“too narrow.”17  The court demonstrated Rule 4.2 was designed to protect 
represented parties from “overreaching by other lawyers who are 
participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the lawyer-
client relationship, and the uncounseled disclosure of information relating 
to the representation.”18  In other words, the rule was created “to prevent 
lawyers from taking advantage of laypersons.”19  The court also noted the 
majority of courts in other states have applied Rule 4.2 to attorneys 
representing themselves.20 
Lucas relied on a case from the Connecticut Supreme Court, Pinsky v. 
Statewide Grievance Committee,21 which ruled an attorney representing 
himself could communicate with a represented party because the attorney 
was not representing a client.22  The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected 
this reasoning, however, in favor of the majority rule.  The court explained 
the majority rule as expressed in In re Disciplinary Action Against Haley23 
and Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar24 fits better with the court’s precedent and 
explained “the policies underlying [Rule 4.2] are better served by extending 
the restriction to lawyers acting pro se.”25 
 
13. Id. ¶ 7, 789 N.W.2d at 75. 
14. Id. ¶ 8, 789 N.W.2d at 75-76. 
15. Id. at 76. 
16. Id. ¶ 9. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. (quoting N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 1 (2012)). 
19. Id. (quoting In re Disciplinary Action Against Hoffman, 2003 ND 161, ¶ 17, 670 N.W.2d 
500, 504). 
20. Id. 
21. 578 A.2d 1075 (Conn. 1990). 
22. In re Disciplinary Action Against Lucas, ¶ 10, 789 N.W.2d at 76 (citing Pinsky, 578 A.2d 
at 1079). 
23. 126 P.3d 1262 (Wash. 2006). 
24. 925 P.2d 1118 (Idaho 1996). 
25. In re Disciplinary Action Against Lucas, ¶ 10, 789 N.W.2d at 76 (quoting In re 
Disciplinary Action Against Haley, 126 P.3d at 1267). 
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Both parties further challenged the sanction imposed on Lucas by the 
hearing panel.26  Disciplinary Counsel argued suspension was a more 
appropriate sanction because Lucas had been suspended once before for 
similar conduct.27  Lucas argued that because he was relying on Pinsky, he 
should not be sanctioned for his conduct.28 
The North Dakota Supreme Court held Lucas’ prior conduct, along 
with the fact that the majority of jurisdictions had rejected Pinsky, should 
have informed Lucas that his letters to the Association board, board 
member, and officer violated Rule 4.2.29  The court noted suspension is 
generally appropriate if a lawyer has previously been reprimanded for 
similar conduct.30  The court, therefore, concluded reprimand was not a 
sufficient sanction, and ordered Lucas be suspended from the practice of 
law for thirty days.31 
Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote a dissenting opinion, asserting the 
court should have adhered to the hearing panel’s sanction.32  The Chief 
Justice agreed Lucas’ conduct violated Rule 4.2.33  He did not agree, 
however, that a lawyer should be disciplined for relying on a minority 
position if the court has not yet rejected that position.34  For that reason, the 
Chief Justice would have imposed public reprimand rather than 
suspension.35 
 
26. Id. ¶ 15, 789 N.W.2d at 77. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. ¶ 16, 789 N.W.2d at 78. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. ¶ 18. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. ¶ 22, 789 N.W.2d at 78-79 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting). 
33. Id. ¶ 23, 789 N.W.2d at 79. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. ¶ 25. 
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AUTOMOBILES—EVIDENCE OF SOBRIETY TESTS—MOTORISTS’ 
RIGHT TO TEST OR TO ADDITIONAL OR ALTERNATIVE TEST 
State v. Tompkins 
 
In State v. Tompkins,36 Randy Tomkins appealed the criminal judgment 
entered after he conditionally pled guilty to the charge of driving under the 
influence.37  Tompkins reserved the right to appeal the district court’s 
denial of his motion to suppress.38  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding the State did not 
impermissibly interfere with Tompkins’ right to obtain and independent 
blood test.39 
In October 2009, Tompkins was arrested and charged with driving 
under the influence.40  After being stopped for a problem with his muffler 
and put through several field sobriety tests, Tompkins was placed under 
arrest.41  Tompkins was then taken to the Jamestown law enforcement 
center, where he was given a breath test.42  The test indicated his blood-
alcohol content exceeded the legal limit.43  Tompkins requested a blood 
test, and the officer replied that he could have one in addition to the breath 
test, but at his own expense.44  The officer then drove Tompkins to the 
Jamestown Hospital for the blood test and informed the hospital staff, while 
en route, that they would be coming for an independent blood test.45 
The officer remained present while the blood draw was performed.46  
The nurse performing the draw used the State Crime Lab kit, which the 
hospital uses for all blood draws that may be introduced in court.47  The 
blood draw was sent to the State Crime Lab to be analyzed.48  The nurse 
who administered the blood test admitted sending the sample to the State 
Crime Lab was standard procedure for legal, rather than personal medical 
 
36. 2011 ND 61, 795 N.W.2d 351. 
37. Tompkins, ¶ 1, 795 N.W.2d at 353. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. ¶ 2. 
41. Id. ¶ 3. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. ¶ 4. 
45. Id. at 353-54. 
46. Id. at 354. 
47. Id. ¶ 5. 
48. Id. 
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purposes.49  The State Crime Lab analyzed the blood sample and returned 
the results to the Jamestown Hospital.50  The Stutsman County State’s 
Attorney’s office also received a copy of the results.51 
Tomkins argued that because the officer did not adequately explain to 
him his rights in obtaining an independent blood test, the nurse used the 
State Crime Lab test kit, the State Crime Lab analyzed the sample, and the 
State’s attorney received a copy of the results, the State improperly 
interfered with his right to obtain and independent blood test.52  Therefore, 
Tomkins argued the blood test as well as the initial breath test given by the 
police should be suppressed.53  The district court partially agreed, suppress-
ing the blood test because “there was too much government involvement.”54  
The district court, however, did not suppress the breath test, and Tompkins 
entered his conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal the district 
court’s decision.55 
On appeal, Tompkins argued the district court erred when it suppressed 
the blood test for excessive state involvement, but failed to also suppress 
the breath test.56  The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by 
noting suppression of a police-administered blood alcohol test is an 
appropriate remedy if a suspect is denied by police a reasonable to obtain an 
independent test.57  In response to Tompkins’ argument that the officer 
failed to inform him of his right to choose his clinic and nurse, the court 
noted an officer has no affirmative duty to assist a suspect in obtaining an 
independent blood alcohol content test.58  While an officer simply cannot 
deny a suspect the opportunity to obtain the test,59 the court squarely 
rejected the notion that law enforcement has “an affirmative duty to ensure 
the accused receives an independent blood test.”60  In this case, the officer 
arranged the blood draw and drove the defendant to the hospital.61  The 
court determined the officer went above and beyond his duty to Tompkins, 
 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. ¶ 6. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. ¶ 7. 
57. Id. ¶ 9. 
58. Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 795 N.W.2d at 355. 
59. Id. ¶ 12. 
60. Id. ¶ 13. 
61. Id. ¶ 14 
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and if Tompkins objected to the hospital or medical professional perform-
ing the blood draw, it was the officer’s duty to object.62 
The court also rejected Tompkins’ argument that the use of the State 
Crime Lab kit and the involvement of the State Crime Lab in analyzing the 
blood sample impermissibly interfered with his right to obtain an 
independent blood test.63  The court laid out the rights North Dakota 
Century Code section 39-20-02 affords an accused regarding an indep-
endent blood test.64  First, the accused has the right to the independent 
blood test.65  Second, the accused has the right to choose who administers 
the test.66  The court noted it has ruled in the past that it is the accused duty 
to assert these rights.67  Therefore, it was not law enforcement that failed to 
afford Tompkins these rights, but Tompkins that failed to assert his own 
rights.68 
Tompkins attempted to use Alaska cases which placed strict 
restrictions on government involvement in independent blood tests.69  The 
court demonstrated, however, that Alaska’s independent blood test statute 
places affirmative duties on those who administer the tests to inform the 
defendant of his or her rights.70  North Dakota does not have a similar 
provision in its independent test statute.71  The court, therefore, ruled the 
Alaska cases were inapplicable to North Dakota.72 
Because the court ruled the government did not impermissibly interfere 
with Tompkins’ right to obtain and independent blood test, the court held 
the lower court should not have suppressed the blood test.73  However, 
because the error did not affect the criminal judgment due to Tompkins’ 
conditional plea of guilty, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court’s criminal judgment.74 
 
62. Id. 
63. Id. ¶ 16, 795 N.W.2d at 356. 
64. Id. ¶ 18. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. ¶ 19 (citing Moberg v. Municipality of Anchorage, 152 P.3d 1170, 1174 n.5 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 2007); McCormick v. Municipality of Anchorage, 999 P.2d 155, 163 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2000)). 
70. Id. ¶ 20, 795 N.W.2d at 357. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. ¶ 23. 
74. Id. 
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AUTOMOBILES—EVIDENCE OF SOBRIETY TESTS—PROCEDURE; 
EVIDENCE AND FACT QUESTIONS 
Lange v. North Dakota Department of Transportation 
 
In Lange v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,75 the North 
Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) appealed the district court’s 
reversal of a DOT hearing officer’s suspension of Lange’s driving 
privileges for ninety-one days.76  Lange’s driving privileges were 
suspended after she was arrested for driving under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor.77  The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the 
district court’s decision, and reinstated the hearing officer’s suspension of 
Lange’s driving privileges.78 
Lange was stopped by Mandan Police Officer Michael Kapella after 
the officer observed her vehicle drift on the roadway.79  Lange failed both a 
field sobriety test and an SD-5 breath test.80  She had spoken to her attorney 
on her cell phone prior to taking the SD-5 test.81  Lange was transported to 
Morton County Jail, where she requested a blood test to determine her 
blood alcohol content.82  After speaking with her attorney again, Lange 
requested the blood test take place at the hospital.83  The officer informed 
Lange that blood draws were normally done at the jail by a nurse.84  
Thereafter, a nurse took Lange’s blood sample, and the results indicated her 
blood alcohol content was over the legal limit.85 
At the administrative hearing, the hearing officer concluded Officer 
Kapella understood Lange requested her blood draw take place at the 
hospital, but Lange did not clearly communicate that she wanted an 
independent blood draw and no one impeded her ability to obtain an 
independent blood draw.86  The hearing officer, therefore, admitted the 
 
75. 2010 ND 201, 790 N.W.2d 28. 
76. Lange, ¶ 1, 790 N.W.2d at 29-30. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 30. 
79. Id. ¶ 2. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. ¶ 3. 
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results of the blood test and suspended Lange’s driving privileges.87  Lange 
appealed the decision to the district court.88  The district court reversed the 
hearing officer’s decision, ruling the officer should have concluded it was 
possible Lange was requesting an independent blood draw and he should 
have tried to clarify what Lange wanted.89 
On appeal, the DOT argued Lange did not make a reasonable request 
for an independent blood draw.90  Lange argued her communications were 
sufficient to at least prompt Officer Kapella to clarify her intentions.91  The 
supreme court began its analysis by noting the great deference it gives to an 
administrative hearing’s decision.92  It noted its review is limited to the 
record filed with the court and it does not make independent findings of 
fact.93 
The court then explained that while law enforcement chooses the type 
and location of its own chemical test, an arrestee is entitled to obtain an 
independent test at his or her own expense, by a medically qualified 
individual of the arrestee’s choosing, and in the location of his or her 
choosing.94  If law enforcement denies an arrestee the right to an 
independent chemical test, the results of law enforcement’s test may be 
suppressed or the charges dismissed.95 
It is incumbent upon the arrestee to request the independent test.96  The 
arrestee’s request for an independent test must further be “clear and 
unambiguous.”97  If the arrestee’s statements are ambiguous, an arrestee 
cannot complain about an officer’s reasonable interpretation of those 
statements.98  An arrestee, however, need not use any particular words to 
request an independent test.99  A law enforcement officer should attempt to 
clarify an ambiguous statement the officer believes may invoke the right to 
an independent chemical test, even if the arrestee does not use the words 
“independent test.”100  However, the court has ruled “if the law enforcement 
 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. ¶ 4. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. ¶ 5. 
93. Id. at 31. 
94. Id. ¶ 6. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. ¶ 7, 790 N.W.2d at 32. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. ¶ 8. 
100. Id. 
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officer does not inquire into the arrestee’s intentions, the arrestee cannot 
rely on ambiguous statements.”101 
According to Officer Kapella’s testimony he had only interpreted 
Lange’s request one way: she wanted an alternate location for the blood 
draw.102  The officer also testified that when Lange was told blood draws 
were conducted at the jail, she did not object or request an independent 
test.103  The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that when it was clear 
Officer Kapella was not giving her more information on an independent 
test, Lange still did not protest.104  The court also noted Officer Kapella’s 
testimony was the only evidence presented and the hearing officer’s 
decision was based on that testimony.105 
Lange also argued that because Officer Lange told her blood draws 
were only done at the jail, she was denied the opportunity to obtain an 
independent blood test.106  She supported her claim by arguing that upon 
first being told she could not be tested at a different location, she may have 
been afraid to make an additional request.107  The DOT argued Lange was 
not denied an opportunity to obtain an independent chemical test.108 
The court explained that while a law enforcement officer cannot 
prevent or hinder an arrestee’s attempt to obtain an independent blood test, 
law enforcement is under no obligation to assist in such a request.109  Law 
enforcement must at least provide access to a telephone in order to obtain 
an independent test.110  In this case, the court ruled it was clear Lange was 
afforded the opportunity to obtain an independent blood test, as was 
displayed by the fact that she spoke on the phone with her attorney at the 
jail.111  The court found no evidence suggesting Lange attempted to obtain 
an independent test, but was hindered by law enforcement.112  The court 
further found no evidence Lange attempted to make arrangements for an 
independent test at all.113  Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court held 
the hearing officer’s decision was supported by the facts, and law 
 
101. Id. 
102. Id. ¶ 9. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. ¶ 11, 790 N.W.2d at 33. 
106. Id. ¶ 12. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. ¶ 13. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. ¶ 14. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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enforcement did not interfere with Lange’s right to obtain an independent 
blood test.114 
 
114. Id. 
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES—SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—
SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT 
State v. Huber 
 
In State v. Huber,115 Jason Huber appealed the district court’s criminal 
judgment convicting him of possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of 
a controlled substance, and manufacture of a controlled substance.116  
Huber argued the district court should have suppressed the police’s search 
of his apartment.117  The North Dakota Supreme Court held the discovery of 
evidence in Huber’s apartment without a warrant was justified under the 
emergency exception to the warrant requirement, upholding Huber’s 
conviction.118 
On December 11, 2009, Huber’s landlord received a phone call from a 
tenant complaining of a “terrible odor” in the apartment building.119  The 
landlord went to investigate the smell and, being unsure of its source, called 
the Mandan Fire Department.120  Two firefighters and the landlord checked 
all of the other apartments except Huber’s before proceeding to Huber’s.121  
By the time they were ready to check Huber’s apartment, two Mandan 
Police Officers had arrived to help identify the source of the smell, which 
was routine procedure.122  The landlord knocked on the door, but received 
no response.123  The landlord, who had the right of entry for emergency 
purposes, then began to unlock the door.124  At this point, Huber opened the 
door a crack, and a very strong ammonia and chemical smell emitted from 
inside that apartment.125  When the emergency personnel attempted to gain 
entry by explaining the situation to Huber, he refused to let them in.126 
Mandan Police Officer Bill Stepp then ordered Huber to step aside so 
the firemen could investigate the source of the smell.127  Huber stepped 
 
115. 2011 ND 23, 793 N.W.2d 781. 
116. Huber, ¶ 1, 793 N.W.2d at 782. 
117. Id. ¶ 9, 793 N.W.2d at 784. 
118. Id. ¶ 1, 793 N.W.2d at 782. 
119. Id. ¶ 2. 
120. Id. at 783. 
121. Id. ¶ 3. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. ¶ 4. 
125. Id. ¶ 5. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
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aside, and as they entered the apartment, a lit propane torch fell to the 
floor.128  Once inside, the firefighters and police found a partial apparatus 
for making methamphetamine, as well as several other indicators of 
methamphetamine production, such as the torn off outer casings of lithium 
batteries.129  Huber was arrested, and the Mandan Police obtained a search 
warrant before going back to seize the evidence.130 
Huber filed a motion to suppress with the district court, arguing there 
was no emergency or exigent circumstances which justified the police’s 
warrantless entry of his apartment.131  The district court denied his motion 
to suppress, noting the landlord’s right of entry and the efforts of 
emergency personnel to secure the safety of tenants rather than conduct a 
thorough search.132  Huber then conditionally pled guilty, reserving the 
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.133 
On appeal, Huber argued there were no exigent or emergency 
circumstances justifying law enforcement’s warrantless entry into his 
apartment.134  The supreme court began its analysis with the Fourth 
Amendment, stating “[t]he right to be secure in one’s home against 
unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed in the United States 
Constitution.”135  This means, according to the court, that when a search or 
seizure is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement 
must obtain a warrant to conduct the search.136  The court also noted, 
however, that emergencies or exigent circumstances may present an 
exception to the general warrant requirement.137 
The court defined an exigent circumstance as “‘an emergency situation 
requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage 
to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction 
of evidence.’”138  The court also defined the emergency exception, stating 
“‘the emergency exception does not involve officers investigating a crime; 
rather, the officers are assisting citizens or protecting property as part of 
their general caretaking responsibilities to the public.’”139  The court ruled 
 
128. Id. 
129. Id. ¶ 6, 793 N.W.2d at 784. 
130. Id. ¶ 7. 
131. Id. ¶ 8. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. ¶ 9. 
135. Id. ¶ 12 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
136. Id. (citing State v. Hammer, 2010 ND 152, ¶ 11, 787 N.W.2d 716, 720). 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 784-85 (quoting State v. DeCoteau, 1999 ND 77, ¶ 15, 592 N.W.2d 579, 584). 
139. Id. ¶ 13 (quoting State v. Matthews, 2003 ND 108, ¶ 13, 665 N.W.2d 28, 32). 
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the emergency exception was more applicable under Huber’s circum-
stances, because firefighters and police entered the apartment not to 
investigate a crime, but to investigate the source of a potentially dangerous 
smell.140 
The court then recited the three requirements to invoke the emergency 
exception.141  First, the police must have a reasonable basis to believe an 
emergency is taking place, and there is an immediate need for action to 
protect life or property.142  Second, the officer’s primary motive must not 
have been to arrest or seize evidence.143  Third, there must be a reasonable 
basis, approximating probable cause, that the emergency is associated with 
the place to be searched.144 
The supreme court then proceeded to analyze each element, beginning 
with whether it was reasonable for the officers to believe an emergency was 
at hand.145  In determining the whether an officer reasonably believed an 
emergency exists, the court uses an objective standard.146  While Huber 
pointed out there was a significant time lapse between the call to the 
landlord and the 911 call, and the firefighters initially responded under the 
impression there was no emergency, the court noted many people on the 
scene testified they believed it was an emergency.147  Officer Jessica Doolin 
told Huber it was an emergency when she asked him to open the door.148  
Officer Stepp also stated he believed they should enter the apartment to 
check for an emergency because of the large about of ammonia and 
chemical smell emerging from the apartment.149  The testimony of all of the 
emergency responders as a whole reflected a belief that the ammonia smell 
presented a serious risk to the building’s occupants.150  For this reason, the 
court ruled it was reasonable for the officers to believe an emergency was at 
hand.151 
Next, the court analyzed whether the search of Huber’s apartment was 
motivated by a desire for seize evidence.152  The court noted law enforce-
 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. ¶ 14. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 793 N.W.2d at 785-86. 
148. Id. ¶ 16, 793 N.W.2d at 786. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. ¶ 17. 
151. Id. ¶ 18. 
152. Id. ¶ 19. 
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ment stayed back and did not help in the search until the evidence of a 
methamphetamine lab was found.153  The court then ruled that upon finding 
this lab, the dangers worsened and law enforcement was justified in 
entering further to assist in searching the apartment.154  The search was 
justified because a methamphetamine lab’s volatile nature requires an 
immediate search to dissipate the danger.155  Therefore, the court found the 
police were not primarily motivated by finding evidence when they entered 
the apartment.156 
Finally, the court analyzed whether the police had a reasonable basis, 
approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the place to 
be searched.157  The circumstances indicated the odor that was the subject 
of the emergency could logically be connected to Huber’s apartment.158  
Every other unit had been searched and no source had been found for the 
odor; Huber’s windows were open in subzero temperatures; and when 
Huber opened his door, fumes poured out of the apartment.159 These 
circumstances were enough, according to court, to satisfy the third 
requirement.160 
Therefore, the supreme court held the emergency exception to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applied, and law 
enforcement was justified in entering Huber’s apartment without a 
warrant.161  The supreme court upheld the district court’s denial of Huber’s 
motion to suppress and upheld the criminal judgment.162 
Justice Crothers specially concurred to state that while he agreed with 
the majority’s decision, he wanted to clarify the need for a warrant once the 
emergency has dissipated.163  Justice Crothers noted that while multiple 
entries may be justified under the facts of a certain case, the emergency 
exception does not give law enforcement a passkey to enter the premises at 
any time in the future.164  When the emergency has dissipated will depend 
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on the facts of the case and, at that time, law enforcement will be required 
to obtain a warrant to reenter the premises.165 
 
165. Id. ¶ 35. 
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CRIMINAL LAW—EVIDENCE—OTHER MISCONDUCT BY 
ACCUSED 
State v. Aabrekke 
 
In State v. Aabrekke,166 Ivan Lee Aabrekke appealed the criminal 
judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition, 
as well as the denial of his motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a 
new trial.167  The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a 
new trial, holding the district court failed to properly apply the analysis 
under the North Dakota Rules of Evidence to determine whether prior act 
evidence is admissible.168 
Aabrekke was charged with gross sexual imposition North Dakota 
Century Code section 12.1-20-03(1)(d).169  The State alleged Aabrekke 
engaged in a sexual act with his thirteen-year-old granddaughter, the 
complainant, on August 16, 2009.170  The alleged incident occurred in 
Aabrekke’s home in Minnewauken, North Dakota.171  Prior to trial, 
Aabrekke moved to exclude evidence that he “has a history of engaging in 
various types of sexual activity with the [complainant] and that this activity 
has occurred over the years” as well as evidence that “relatives of 
[Aabrekke] may have engaged in sexual acts with either the [complainant], 
or the [complainant’s] mother.”172  The district court denied the motion, 
allowing the evidence which could “show motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.”173  At trial, Aabrekke’s granddaughter testified a sexual act 
occurred on the morning of August 19, 2009 while she, her mother, and her 
brother were staying at Aabrekke’s home for the weekend.174  The 
complainant did not tell her mother, Aabrekke’s daughter, about the 
incident until after they had returned to their home in Minnesota.175  The 
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complainant’s mother then informed authorities in Minnesota of the 
incident.176 
After the complainant testified about the August 16, 2009 incident, the 
State asked the complainant if she had previously told her mother about any 
sexual contact.177  Aabrekke objected to the question, and the court 
questioned the State out of the presence of the jury about what the State 
intended to prove by the question.178  During the colloquy, the State argued 
the evidence was indicative of a continuing course of conduct by Aabrekke, 
and the continuing course of conduct amounted to plan or preparation.179  
Aabrekke, on the other hand, argued the evidence was being offered as 
character evidence to make the alleged incident seem more likely.180  
Aabrekke also argued the prejudicial nature of the evidence “far 
outweighed” the probative value because the prosecution does not need the 
evidence to prove the elements of gross sexual imposition.181  The district 
court allowed the evidence, ruling the evidence fit within the exception to 
North Dakota Rule of Evidence 404(b) allowing evidence of prior crimes, 
wrongs, or acts if it is introduced for other purposes besides proving 
conformity with such acts.182 
The complainant went on to testify Aabrekke had engaged in prior 
sexual contact with her.183  The complainant also testified Aabrekke had 
raped the complainant’s mother in the past.184  During the complainant’s 
mother testimony, the State questioned her about past sexual abuse she 
experienced in the family.185  Aabrekke objected to this testimony as well, 
arguing the testimony was irrelevant, but the court allowed the testimony as 
proof that “there are not strong defense mechanisms within the family.”186  
The prosecution then used this testimony to explain why the complainant 
did not tell her mother about the incident immediately.187 
On appeal, Aabrekke argued the district court erred in allowing 
evidence of prior sexual contact with his granddaughter, as well as his 
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daughter’s testimony about being raped by her uncle.188  Aabrekke also 
argued the district court failed to apply the proper three-prong analysis for 
admitting prior bad act evidence, and the court failed to give a cautionary 
instruction regarding the limited purpose of the evidence.189  Finally, 
Aabrekke argued the danger of unfair prejudice inherent in the evidence of 
his prior acts outweighed the probative value of the evidence.190 
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by pointing out 
that it has repeatedly warned courts about the dangers of allowing evidence 
of prior acts to show propensity.191  The court then outlined the general rule 
for admitting evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts, found in North 
Dakota Rule of Evidence 404(b).192  Rule 404(b) first makes evidence of 
prior crimes, wrongs, or other acts inadmissible to prove conformity 
therewith.193  The rule does not, however, make such evidence inadmissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.194  In other 
words, the evidence must be “substantially relevant for some purpose other 
than” showing the person’s character and the person’s conformity 
therewith.195 
When considering this evidence, the court noted “the mere invocation 
of an exception does not end the inquiry,” but the district court must instead 
apply a three-step analysis to determine whether the evidence is 
admissible.196  First, “the [district] court must look to the purpose for which 
the evidence is introduced.”197  Next, the district court must determine if the 
of the prior act is “substantially reliable or clear and convincing.”198  
Finally, in criminal cases, there must be proof of the crime alleged 
independent of the prior act, which permits the trier of fact to establish guilt 
or innocence.199  The district court may satisfy the third prong by a 
cautionary instruction warning the jury of the limited purpose of the prior 
act evidence.200  Even if all three prongs are satisfied, the district court must 
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still consider whether the prejudicial effect of the prior act evidence 
outweighs the probative value of the evidence under Rule 403.201 
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that in several cases—State v. 
Paul,202 State v. Alvarado,203 and State v. Christensen—204evidence prior 
acts and crimes had been admitted for a variety of purposes other than 
showing conformity with criminal character.205  The court also noted the 
“common thread” among these cases was that the district court was required 
to conduct the necessary analysis under Rules 404(b) and 403 and give the 
proper cautionary instruction.206  The supreme court ruled the State’s 
purpose for presenting the evidence—to show planning, preparation, and 
grooming, as well as to prove why the complainant did not tell her mother 
about the conduct immediately—was a proper purpose under North Dakota 
Rule of Evidence 404(b).207  However, the supreme court found no 
evidence in the record that the district court applied the three-prong analysis 
to the prior act evidence the State sought to introduce, or that the district 
court gave the proper limiting instruction to the jury to ensure the evidence 
was only considered for its stated limited purpose.208 
Because the supreme court found the district court misapplied the law 
when weighing the admission of the prior bad act evidence, it held the 
district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.209  The court 
did not pass judgment on whether the evidence would be admissible if the 
correct analysis was applied.210  Rather, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.211 
Justice Sandstrom dissented, concluding the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting the evidence of Aabrekke’s prior acts.212  Justice 
Sandstrom reasoned that the district court properly allowed the 
complainant’s testimony about prior victimization by Aabrekke as evidence 
of “plan and the like.”213  Justice Sandstrom also noted the defendant’s 
questioning elicited some of the evidence, thus making it unobjectable, and 
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the evidence of the other family member’s prior sexual abuse acts against 
the complainant’s mother were not admitted to show Aabrekke’s conform-
ity therewith.214  Furthermore, Justice Sandstrom reasoned that while the 
district court did not give a cautionary instruction, a district court is not 
required to give such an instruction unless requested by a party.215  As a 
result, Justice Sandstrom would have affirmed the district court’s 
decision.216 
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CRIMINAL LAW—QUESTIONS OF FACT AND FINDINGS—POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 
Johnson v. State 
 
In Johnson v. State,217 Johnson appealed from the summary dismissal 
of his application for post-conviction relief.218  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court ruled summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief 
was not appropriate because res judicata is an affirmative defense and a 
district court cannot dismiss a proceeding on the basis of res judicata on the 
court’s own motion.219  The court reversed the judgment and remanded for 
further proceedings.220 
Johnson was convicted of two counts of contact by bodily fluids in 
2008.221  The trial consisted of both a criminal act phase and a criminal 
responsibility phase.222  On appeal from the trial, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court summarily upheld the conviction.223  After the appeal, 
Johnson applied for post-conviction relief, claiming prosecutorial miscon-
duct and ineffective assistance of counsel.224  The district court denied his 
application and the North Dakota Supreme Court summarily affirmed the 
dismissal on appeal.225  Johnson applied for post-conviction relief a second 
time by a letter, which was denied as res judicata.226 
Johnson then applied for post-conviction relief a third time, claiming 
insufficient evidence as to his criminal responsibility and ineffective 
assistance of counsel by both his direct-appeal counsel and first post-
conviction proceeding counsel.227  The district court summarily dismissed 
the application on its own motion, ruling the application was res judicata 
because the supreme court had already ruled on the sufficiency of the 
evidence regarding his criminal responsibility.228  The district court further 
ruled that because the direct appeal lawyer did raise the sufficiency of the 
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evidence argument on appeal, Johnson could not claim his direct-appeal 
counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue and likewise could not 
claim his first post-conviction counsel was ineffective for not raising an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim against his direct-appeal counsel on 
the same basis.229 
The North Dakota Supreme Court held the district court erred in 
summarily dismissing the case because it errantly believed the supreme 
court had previously ruled on Johnson’s challenge of the sufficiency of the 
evidence on the finding of criminal responsibility.230  The court explained 
its ruling in the direct appeal only dealt with the sufficiency of the evidence 
concerning the criminal act.231  The court, therefore, had not ruled on 
whether the evidence was sufficient to find criminal responsibility, and the 
issue could not have been res judicata.232 
The supreme court also held that while the district court does have the 
power to summarily dismiss an application for post-conviction relief on 
grounds of res judicata, the district court does not have the power to do so 
sua sponte.233  Res judicata and misuse of process are affirmative defenses 
that must first be pled by the State before the court can summarily dismiss 
the application.234  The court, therefore, reversed the district court’s 
summary dismissal of Johnson’s application for post-conviction relief and 
remanded the matter for further proceedings.235 
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INFANTS—RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS TO ADULT 
PROSECUTIONS—JUVENILE TRANSFERS AND 
CERTIFICATIONS 
IN RE R.A. 
 
In In re R.A.,236 R.A. appealed a juvenile court order transferring 
jurisdiction to district court under North Dakota Century Code section 27-
20-34(1)(b).237  He also appealed the district court order affirming the 
transfer.238  The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding the 
juvenile court did not err in finding probable cause existed, the juvenile 
court did not misinterpret or misapply the transfer statute, and R.A.’s 
confrontation rights were not violated.239 
A delinquency petition and notice of intent to transfer to district court 
was filed in March 2010, alleging R.A. committed the offenses of gross 
sexual imposition, terrorizing, and harassment.240  The delinquency petition 
specifically alleged R.A. had engaged in a sexual act with A.H., another 
juvenile, by compelling her to submit by threat of imminent death or serious 
bodily injury.241 
During the transfer hearing, A.H. testified to the circumstances that 
lead to the allegations against R.A.242  The State also offered copies of 
numerous text messages and other written messages that A.H. had received 
from R.A.243  A.H. testified she had previously been in a dating relationship 
with R.A. from November 2008 to August 2009, but after their dating 
relationship ended, the two of them remained friends.244  A.H. testified she 
spoke on the phone to R.A., received text messages from his cellular phone, 
and received Facebook messages from him everyday from February 18, 
2010 to February 28, 2010.245  She further testified R.A. told her drug 
dealers were attempting to get his uncle to traffic drugs and, as a result, he 
was being threatened.246  R.A. told A.H. the drug dealers were threatening 
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to harm her, as well, and if they went to the police, the drug dealers would 
find out and kill them both.247  R.A. told A.H. they had to comply with the 
drug dealers demands at all times, if they wanted to stay alive.248 
A.H. testified to numerous demands made by the drug dealers.249  
According to her testimony, the drug dealers demanded she change her 
relationship status on Facebook to reflect she was in a relationship with 
R.A.250  In one instance, she received a text message from R.A.’s cell phone 
that stated R.A. was being drugged because she did not comply with the 
demand fast enough.251  A.H. also testified she received other text 
messages, which she believed were from the drug dealers, advising her she 
was being watched to ensure she complied with their demands.252  In 
another instance on February 22, 2010, A.H. received a Facebook message 
from R.A.’s account demanding that she be with R.A. sexually.253  A.H. 
testified the next day she invited R.A. to her house and he gave her a 
hickey, claiming it was one of the demands.254  R.A. also tried to have sex 
with A.H., there was penetration, and R.A. again claimed it was one of the 
demands.255 
On February 24, 2010, before leaving on a trip to New York, A.H. 
testified R.A. called and told her the drug dealers were demanding she 
come over to his house and kiss him before she left town.256  However, 
A.H. testified she was unable to go to R.A.’s house before leaving town, 
and on February 25, 2010, she received a text message from R.A. indicating 
the drug dealers had drugged him and he had to go to the hospital.257  While 
traveling to New York, A.H. then received a message from R.A.’s 
Facebook account making several demands for her to tell her friends that 
R.A. gave her a hickey, purchase R.A. an expensive gift, call and meet with 
R.A. as soon as she returned home, and perform oral sex on each other.258  
The message also stated that if A.H. only completed two of the demands, 
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R.A. would be drugged enough to make him sick and if she chose to only 
complete one of the demands, R.A. would be electrocuted.259  A.H. testified 
she told her friends about the threats after they became suspicious of her 
behavior.260 
Between February 27, 2010 and February 28, 2010, A.H. testified she 
received numerous demands from the drug dealers.261  These demands 
included apologizing to R.A. for failing to tell him she loved him, having 
sex with R.A., and performing sexual acts on R.A., as well as time limits by 
which she needed to respond or the drug dealers “would make many people 
feel pain.”262  A.H. testified she tried to negotiate with the drug dealers, but 
they told her “she needed to give her answer or they would rape her.”263  On 
February 28, 2010, A.H. returned from New York and invited R.A. over to 
her house.264  A.H. testified she showed R.A. the text messages she had 
received and they decided they should cooperate with the demands of the 
drug dealers.265  A.H. testified she and R.A. performed oral sex on each 
other; however, she also testified she felt uncomfortable, was very upset, 
and kept crying.266  She further testified “she only participated to keep R.A. 
and herself safe and alive.”267 
Approximately a half an hour after R.A. left her house, A.H. testified 
she received another message from the drug dealers through her Facebook 
account.268  The message stated the drug dealers were not satisfied and 
indicated they saw her crying inside her house.269  The drug dealers 
demanded A.H. go over to R.A.’s house and give him his present by 3:00 
a.m. or they were going to drug him and he would probably die.270  A.H. 
testified she locked the doors to her house, closed the blinds, and went into 
her bedroom and cried because she was so scared.271 
During the transfer hearing, A.H.’s mother also testified.272  She 
testified A.H.’s friends showed her the numerous Facebook messages in 
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A.H.’s account.273  A.H.’s mother testified she went to R.A.’s house and 
met with him and one of his parents.274  According to A.H.’s mother, 
although R.A. initially claimed he was being threatened, he finally admitted 
to writing and sending the messages to A.H.275 
Following the transfer hearing, the judicial referee found probable 
cause existed to believe R.A. “committed the offense of gross sexual 
imposition by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or 
kidnapping . . . .”276  The judicial referee also ordered the case be trans-
ferred to district court under North Dakota Century Code section 27-20-
34(1)(b).277  Subsequently, R.A. argued “the evidence did not support a 
finding of probable cause, the judicial referee misinterpreted or misapplied 
the transfer statute because the statute requires the threats be to the victim 
and not another person, and his confrontation rights were violated.”278  
Therefore, he requested a district court judge review the judicial referee’s 
findings and order.279  The district court affirmed as well as adopted the 
judicial referee’s findings and order.280 
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the juvenile 
court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard of review.281  
R.A. first argued it was an error for the juvenile court to transfer jurisdiction 
to district court because the State failed to establish probable cause and 
failed to present any evidence that R.A. acted by force or his conduct 
presented an imminent threat to A.H.282  R.A. next argued the charge of 
gross sexual imposition could only be transferred if probable cause existed 
to believe there were threats of imminent harm to the victim because the 
evidence failed to demonstrate A.H. suffered threats of imminent harm.283  
Lastly, R.A. argued his inability to cross-examine A.H. during the transfer 
hearing about her sexual history with him resulted in his Sixth Amendment 
confrontation rights being violated.284 
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R.A.’s first argument was that the threats of physical harm were not 
imminent, but instead were threats of future conduct, and this evidence was 
insufficient to support the juvenile courts finding of probable cause.285  
R.A. asserted his case was similar to Lawrence v. Delkamp286 and Ficklin v. 
Ficklin,287 where the court previously held that “district court’s findings of 
domestic violence were clearly erroneous because the threats of physical 
harm were not imminent.”288  After an examination of Lawrence and 
Ficklin, the court determined R.A.’s case was distinguishable based upon 
the juvenile court’s findings.289  During the transfer hearing, A.H. testified 
she believed the threats were being carried out and, if she did not comply 
with the deadlines, the drug dealers would harm R.A.290  A.H. also testified 
she believed the drug dealers were watching her constantly and were able to 
act immediately if she did not comply with their demands.291  The court 
noted “imminent” means close or near at hand rather than touching; it does 
not mean immediate.292  Based upon the evidence presented at the transfer 
hearing, the court determined a finding of probable cause to believe threats 
of imminent death or serious bodily injury was supported.293 
R.A. also claimed there was conflicting evidence and the actions of 
A.H. failed to denote a fear of imminent physical harm.294  However, the 
court emphasized a transfer hearing is comparable to a preliminary examin-
ation in a criminal proceeding, and the juvenile court does not determine the 
credibility of the evidence presented because questions regarding conflict-
ing evidence or credibility are questions of fact for a jury to decide.295  The 
court held “the juvenile court did not err in finding there [was] substantial 
evidence establishing probable cause to believe R.A. committed the offense 
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of gross sexual imposition by threat of imminent death or serious bodily 
injury.”296 
The court next addressed whether the juvenile court misinterpreted and 
misapplied North Dakota Century Code section 27-20-34.297  Specifically, 
R.A. argued the plain language of the gross sexual imposition statute 
required that there be probable cause to believe threats of imminent harm 
were made to the victim before a case could be transferred from juvenile 
court to district court.298  R.A. alleged the evidence did not show A.H. 
suffered threats of imminent harm and, therefore, his case was transferred 
erroneously.299 
The court explained when it examines statutes, each word is given its 
ordinary meaning; however, if a statute is ambiguous or if an absurd or 
ludicrous result is reached by adhering to the strict letter, they may look at 
extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, to interpret the statute’s mean-
ing.300  Although the court presumes the legislature did not intend a statute 
to yield an absurd or ludicrous result or unjust consequence, a statute is 
deemed ambiguous “if it is susceptible to different, rational meanings.”301 
The plain language of section 27-20-34(1)(b) indicates the crime of 
gross sexual imposition of a victim by threat of imminent death, serious 
bodily injury, or kidnapping shall be transferred.302  After an examination of 
the plain language of this statute, the court decided the statute was not 
ambiguous.303  However, R.A. was charged with gross sexual imposition in 
violation of section 12.1-20-03(1)(a), “which states that an individual is 
guilty of gross sexual imposition if he engages in a sexual act with another 
or causes another to engage in a sexual act by compelling the victim to 
submit . . . by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or 
kidnapping, to be inflicted on any human being.”304 
R.A. argued because the wording of section 27-20-34 does not use the 
language “inflicted on any human being,” like section 12.1-20-03(1)(a), the 
threat must be inflicted on the victim.305  The court found the difference in 
wording of these two statutes insignificant.306  In support of its finding, the 
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court indicated the legislature included several offenses in the transfer 
statute they determined should be transferred to district court, including 
gross sexual imposition under section 12.1-20-03(1)(a).307  The court noted 
the purpose of section 27-20-34 was to transfer violent crimes to district 
court and gross sexual imposition by force or threat of imminent harm is a 
transferrable crime.308  After determining the evidence supported the 
juvenile court’s finding, the court held R.A.’s case was properly transferred 
to district court and the transfer statute was not misinterpreted or 
misapplied.309 
Lastly, the court explained R.A.’s confrontation rights were not 
violated when he was not allowed to cross-examine A.H. regarding her 
sexual history with him.310  The court began by stating that although the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause grants criminal defendant’s the 
right to physically face whoever is testifying against them, a juvenile 
involved in a juvenile transfer hearing is not entitled all of the constitutional 
guarantees granted in a criminal proceeding.311  However, a juvenile 
transfer hearing must satisfy the basic requirements of due process and 
fairness because it is considered a “critically important” proceeding.312  The 
court emphasized A.H. testified at the transfer hearing and R.A. cross-
examined her, and therefore, the issue raised by R.A. was an issue of the 
admissibility of evidence rather than a confrontation issue.313  The court 
indicated that during a juvenile transfer hearing, a juvenile is not allowed 
greater evidentiary protection than criminal defendants receive at pretrial 
proceedings.314  Because the rules of evidence do not apply during a 
juvenile transfer hearing, the court held R.A.’s Sixth Amendment 
confrontation rights were not violated.315 
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JUDGMENT—SUMMARY PROCEEDING—NATURE OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Locken v. Locken 
 
In Locken v. Locken,316 David Locken appealed the district court’s 
summary judgment dismissal of his action to determine his ownership 
interest in a tract of land in Dickey County.317  Locken argued his claim was 
not barred by the statute of limitations under North Dakota Century Code 
section 28-01-42 for an action on a contract for deed.318  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court held the statute of limitations for a contract for deed did bar 
David Locken’s claim.319  The supreme court concluded that for a debt 
secured by a contract for deed, the due date of the last payment is the day 
when the contract was satisfied.320 
David Locken purchased a tract of land with his father, Virgil Locken, 
in February of 1973 from Wanda Johnson and Ardys Sand by a contract for 
deed.321  The final payment on the contract for deed was scheduled for 
March 1, 1998, and upon full performance of the contract for deed, Johnson 
and Sand would convey to Virgil and David Locken a warranty deed.322  In 
1974, David Locken assigned his interest in the tract of land to Virgil and 
Marjorie Locken.323  In 1977, Sand and Johnson conveyed the land by 
warranty deed to Virgil Locken individually.324  The deed was recorded in 
March of 1978.325  Virgil Locken then gifted the land to his children, except 
David Locken, who then conveyed the interest in the land to the Virgil and 
Marjorie Locken Family Trust.326 
Marjorie Locken died in 2001 and devised by will her interest in the 
land to David Locken.327  Virgil Locken died in 2006, and his will also 
devised all of his interest in the land to David Locken.328  In 2007, Loren 
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Locken, trustee of the Virgil and Marjorie Locken Family Trust, executed 
and recorded an affidavit of possession.329  The Trust then conveyed the 
land to Bernard Vculek.330 
David Locken brought an action in January 2008, claiming Marjorie 
Locken had a one-fourth interest in the land when she died and he was 
entitled to that one-fourth interest as a devisee of her will.331  The 
defendants responded by arguing the statute of limitations had run and the 
Marketable Record Title Act, therefore, barred the action.332  The district 
court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion and dismissed the 
case, ruling the statute of limitations had expired and the claim was not 
subject to a statutory exception.333 
On appeal, David Locken argued the district court erred in finding his 
January 2008 action was barred by the statute of limitations because he 
brought the action within ten years of the due date of the final payment of 
the contract for deed.334  Locken argued under North Dakota Century Code 
section 28-01-42, “due date” means the date the last payment was last 
scheduled, not the date the last payment was actually made.335  The 
defendant argued “due date” means “the date the last payment was actually 
made and the contract for deed was satisfied.”336 
The North Dakota Supreme Court first outlined the Marketable Record 
Title Act, noting that a person with possession of a piece of land and 
unbroken chain of title to an interest in the land may convey the land free 
and clear of any claim based upon an “act, transaction, event, or omission 
occurring twenty years or more before,” and bars the action from 
commencing.337  However, “the provisions for marketable record title do 
not ‘bar . . . [r]ights founded upon any mortgage, trust deed, or contract for 
sale of lands which is not barred by the statute of limitations.’”338  
Therefore, if David Locken’s claim was not barred by the statute of 
limitations for a contract for sale of lands, or a contract for deed in this case, 
his claim would also not be barred by the Marketable Record Title Act.339 
 
329. Id. 
330. Id. 
331. Id. ¶ 5. 
332. Id. 
333. Id. ¶ 6, 797 N.W.2d at 304. 
334. Id. ¶ 8. 
335. Id. 
336. Id. 
337. Id. ¶ 11, 797 N.W.2d at 305. 
338. Id. ¶ 12, 797 N.W.2d at 306 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1-11(1)(c) (1999)). 
339. See id. 
           
2011] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 451 
The supreme court next considered whether the statute of limitations as 
codified in North Dakota Century Code section 28-01-42 had run when 
David Locken brought his claim in January 2008.340  The statute bars an 
action to cancel or enforce a contract for the sale or conveyance of real 
estate after twenty years from the recording of the instrument unless fewer 
than ten years have elapsed from the due date of the last payment of the 
debt on the contract or fewer than ten years since the claim for relief 
accrued.341  Because the statute “do[es] not necessarily contemplate earlier 
satisfaction of a contract for deed,” the supreme court ruled the interrela-
tionship between this statute and section 28-01-15(2)-requiring title actions 
to be brought within ten years after relief has accrued-was ambiguous, and 
it could look to extrinsic aids beyond the plain language to interpret 
them.342 
In order to interpret the statutes, the court looked to the Iowa Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of an Iowa statute similar to North Dakota’s section 
28-01-42.343  The Iowa courts explained “a mortgage remains in effect until 
the debt is paid or discharged, or the mortgage is released.”344  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court also noted the Iowa authorities made clear the intent 
of the statutes was to clarify titles to real property from the record itself.345  
Citing this purpose, the court construed “due date of the last payment on the 
indebtedness or part thereof, secured thereby” to mean the date in the record 
the contract for deed is satisfied.346 
As a result, the court ruled that because David Locken brought the 
action in January 2008, more than ten years after the March 1978 
satisfaction of the contract for deed, the action was barred by the statute of 
limitations.347  The court therefore affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment and dismissal of the action.348 
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VENDOR AND PURCHASER—RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF 
PARTIES—BONA FIDE PURCHASERS 
Swanson v. Swanson 
 
In Swanson v. Swanson,349 Glenn Swanson appealed the district court’s 
judgment quieting title to real property in Michael Swanson, James 
Swanson, Robert Swanson, and Candyce Swanson (the Swanson 
children).350  The North Dakota Supreme Court held the district court erred 
in analyzing the notice requirement for a good faith purchaser and erred in 
finding the Swanson children acted in good faith when purchasing the 
property.351  The court, therefore, reversed the judgment and remanded the 
case for judgment consistent with the opinion.352 
In 1963, William Swanson and Lorraine Swanson, his wife, conveyed a 
piece of real estate in Bottineau County to William Swanson and Glenn 
Swanson, William’s brother, as joint tenants by a warranty deed.353  The 
property had originally been owned by Glenn and William’s stepmother, 
Anna Swanson, who had conveyed the property to William with Glenn’s 
help.354  Lorrain had no ownership interest in the land, but was apparently 
included in the deed to disclaim any homestead claim.  Glenn and William 
never recorded the deed.355  In 1969, Glenn Swanson recorded a mortgage 
on the property in favor of Arlo Swanson, his brother.356 
William Swanson died in 1999.357  At William’s 1999 funeral in 
Florida, Glenn Swanson asked Lorraine Swanson to look for William’s 
copy of the joint tenancy deed.358  Despite Glenn’s assertion of ownership, 
Lorraine, as personal representative for the estate, conveyed the property to 
herself as trustee of her revocable trust in 2000.359  In 2001, at an inurnment 
ceremony for William, Glenn again asserted his interest in the property, this 
time to William and Lorraine’s son, Robert Swanson.360  In 2003, Lorraine, 
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as trustee for her revocable trust, conveyed property to the Swanson 
children.361  The deed was recorded on July 21, 2003.362 
Glenn found the joint tenancy deed in 2005, two years after the 
Swanson children recorded their deed.363  Glenn recorded his joint tenancy 
deed in November 2005.364  In January 2008, the Swanson children initiated 
a quiet title action against Glenn Swanson.365  Glenn counterclaimed to 
quiet title in his name and also brought a third-party action against Lorrain 
Swanson based on her conveyance in 1963 warranty deed.366  The district 
court ruled Glenn Swanson had no interest in the claim and quieted title in 
the Swanson children because the children acted in good faith when they 
recorded the deed and paid valuable consideration for the property.367 
On appeal, Glenn Swanson argued the district court erred in quieting 
title in the Swanson children.368  Glenn argued the Swanson children were 
not good-faith purchasers and they did not pay valuable consideration for 
the land.369  Glenn asserted the district court should have quieted title in 
him because, under the 1963 deed, the property should have passed to him 
in 1999 as a joint tenant.370 
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by stating the 
dispositive issue was whether the Swanson children acted in good faith.371  
As the court noted, good faith depends on whether the children had actual 
or constructive notice of Glenn Swanson’s claim of ownership of the 
land.372  The court then outlined what constitutes actual or constructive 
notice.373  Quoting North Dakota Century Code section 1-01-25, the court 
explained “[e]very person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient 
to put a prudent person upon inquiry as to a particular fact and who omits to 
make such inquiry with reasonable diligence is deemed to have constructive 
notice of the fact itself.”374  In other words, “a purchaser who fails to make 
the requisite inquiry cannot claim the protection of a good-faith 
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purchaser . . . .”375  A purchaser who fails to make the requisite inquiry will 
be assumed to know any facts such an inquiry would have uncovered.376 
The court then broke the inquiry into two parts: first, whether the 
Swanson children had actual notice of circumstances which would have put 
a prudent person on inquiry as to the ownership of the property;377 and 
second, whether the Swanson children did inquire into the circumstances as 
was their duty after having actual notice of the circumstances.378  The court 
ruled the Swanson children did have actual notice of Glenn Swanson’s 
claim and, therefore, had a duty to inquire into that claim.379  To support 
this ruling, the supreme court pointed to the fact that Glenn Swanson 
informed Robert Swanson, one of the Swanson children, of his claim to the 
property at the 2001 inurnment ceremony.380  The court noted a statement 
by a claimant to an adverse right to a piece of property could be enough to 
put a prudent person on inquiry.381  The court also pointed to its own 
precedent, which has established a statement of adverse interest need not 
lay out all of the details of the adverse interest.382  Thus, the court held the 
assertion of ownership to Robert Swanson by Glenn Swanson was enough 
to put the Swanson children on inquiry about the ownership of the land.383 
The court then turned to whether the Swanson children made any 
inquiry into Glenn Swanson’s claim of ownership over the land.384  The 
court noted there was no inquiry found in the record, and the district court 
even stated it did not know what inquiry had been made.385  In such a 
circumstance, a purchaser who has actual notice and has been put on 
inquiry can be assumed to know any facts that would probably have been 
discovered if properly pursued.386  In this case, the supreme court concluded 
it was likely the Swanson children would have found, upon proper inquiry, 
that Glenn Swanson had recorded a mortgage on the property in 1969, 
which granted Arlo Swanson a security interest in Glenn Swanson’s interest 
in the property.387 
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The court also dealt with the district court’s ruling that Glenn Swanson 
was a “stranger” to the chain of title pursuant to Title Standard 2-01 of the 
North Dakota State Bar Association and, therefore, the record or the 
mortgage could have been ignored.388  The court rejected this ruling, 
pointing to the fact that a prospective purchaser may only ignore a stranger 
to the title if the prospective purchaser acted in good faith.389  According to 
Title Standard 2-01, “[a]ny circumstances which should cause further 
inquiry to be made as to the status of the ‘stranger’ which inquiry would 
disclose the unrecorded interest of the ‘stranger’, preclude ignoring the 
‘stranger’s’ conveyance.”390  Here, the Swanson children conducted no 
inquiry into Glenn Swanson’s claim of ownership and, therefore, could not 
have acted in good faith.391  This not only made the “stranger” claim 
invalid, it prevented the Swanson children from claiming good-faith 
purchaser status.392 
Finally, the court ruled the laches and equitable estoppel defenses 
would not be available to the Swanson children for two reasons.393  First, 
the Swanson children had not properly pleaded these defenses at the trial 
level.394  Second, laches and equitable estoppel were not available unless 
the Swanson children were good-faith purchasers, which the court ruled 
they were not.395 
Justice Sandstrom dissented from the majority because he would have 
upheld the lower court’s ruling that the Swanson children were good-faith 
purchasers.396  Justice Sandstrom first pointed out that absent a reasonable 
investigation into Glenn Swanson’s claim, the Swanson children would 
only have been charged with the knowledge of the facts a reasonable 
inquiry would have found.397  He reasoned a reasonable inquiry by the 
Swanson children would have yielded nothing.398  Justice Sandstrom further 
objected to the majority’s ruling that Glenn Swanson was not a “stranger” 
to the chain of title, reasoning the Swanson children had no knowledge of 
an actual interest held by Glenn Swanson, but only had knowledge of 
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Glenn’s claim to an interest.399  Justice Sandstrom warned this ruling would 
frustrate the rule of Title Standard 2-01 by allowing an unsubstantiated 
claim to establish title.400  Because he would rule the Swanson children 
were good faith purchasers, Justice Sandstrom also would have allowed the 
Swanson children to pursue the laches and equitable estoppel defenses.401 
Chief Justice VandeWalle also dissented.402  The Chief Justice joined 
in Justice Sandstrom’s dissent on the issue of good faith, but would have 
remanded to the district court to find facts on whether the Swanson children 
paid valuable consideration for the land.403  The Chief Justice reasoned that 
while there was some evidence in the record indicating the Swanson 
children gave valuable consideration for the land, the district court erred in 
making its finding of valuable consideration.404  The Chief Justice noted 
North Dakota precedent has established that in order to fulfill the “valuable 
consideration” prong of good-faith purchaser protection, a purchaser must 
give something substantial in exchange for the property.405  In this case, the 
record showed the purported consideration given was ten dollars, plus a 
promise to visit and care for Lorraine Swanson for the rest of her life.406  
The district court did not make any findings of specific financial value for 
the support and services given to Lorraine Swanson.407  The district court 
framed the question of whether substantial value was given as a question of 
whether Lorraine received something of value to her.408  The Chief Justice 
explained that to determine whether the consideration was valuable, or 
whether the Swanson children parted with something of value, the district 
court should have analyzed the value given by the Swanson children against 
the fair market value.409  For these reasons, the Chief Justice would have 
remanded to the district court to find a specific financial value of the 
services the Swanson children promised to Lorraine Swanson and compare 
that value with the fair market value to determine whether the Swanson 
children parted with something of substantial value.410 
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